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rior Convictions
ayesian Approaches to the Analysis and Interpretation of Clinical Megatrials
eorge A. Diamond, MD, FACC, Sanjay Kaul, MD
os Angeles, California
Large, randomized clinical trials (“megatrials”) are key drivers of modern cardiovascular
practice, since they are cited frequently as the authoritative foundation for evidence-based
management policies. Nevertheless, fundamental limitations in the conventional approach to
statistical hypothesis testing undermine the scientific basis of the conclusions drawn from
these trials. This review describes the conventional approach to statistical inference,
highlights its limitations, and proposes an alternative approach based on Bayes’ theorem.
Despite its inherent subjectivity, the Bayesian approach possesses a number of practical
advantages over the conventional approach: 1) it allows the explicit integration of previous
knowledge with new empirical data; 2) it avoids the inevitable misinterpretations of p values
derived from megatrial populations; and 3) it replaces the misleading p value with a summary
statistic having a natural, clinically relevant interpretation—the probability that the study
hypothesis is true given the observations. This posterior probability thereby quantifies the
likelihood of various magnitudes of therapeutic benefit rather than the single null magnitude
to which the p value refers, and it lends itself to graphical sensitivity analyses with respect to
its underlying assumptions. Accordingly, the Bayesian approach should be employed more
widely in the design, analysis, and interpretation of clinical megatrials. (J Am Coll Cardiol
2004;43:1929–39) © 2004 by the American College of Cardiology Foundationc
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fWhat used to be called judgment is now called prejudice,
and what used to be called prejudice is now called a null
hypothesis. . . . [I]t is dangerous nonsense (dressed up as the
‘scientific method’) and will cause much trouble before it is
widely appreciated as such.
—A. W. F. Edwards
(Cambridge University Press, 1972)
he randomized trial is the apotheosis of scientific progress
n clinical medicine (1–4). Presently, more and more inves-
igators are employing this tool in larger and larger study
opulations to identify smaller and smaller differences be-
ween treatment groups (5–13). These so-called “megatri-
ls” have thereby become key drivers of modern medical
ractice, since they are cited frequently as the authoritative
oundation for evidence-based management policies.
Nevertheless, the published reports of these trials persis-
ently fail to interpret the observations in the context of
elevant background information—our prior convictions—
elying almost exclusively instead on the conventional p
alue as the operative standard of scientific inference (14).
his lapse is all the more troubling because these very same
rials serve to reveal fundamental limitations in the inferen-
ial process itself, which, although presaged for some time
15–19), have had little practical consequence until the
dvent of the megatrial era. Without exaggeration, if this
rocess is undermined, so too is the scientific basis of
From the Division of Cardiology, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, and the School of
edicine, University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Manuscript received October 1, 2003; revised manuscript received January 2, 2004,iccepted January 12, 2004.ardiovascular practice. Yet, this issue has never been
ddressed in the cardiovascular literature (17–24).
Accordingly, we herein: 1) review the process of scientific
nference from a clinician’s perspective—with particular
eference to the cardiovascular megatrial—outlining the
nherent limitations of the prevailing statistical paradigm
nd the rationale in support of an alternative Bayesian
pproach; 2) describe ways to implement this Bayesian
pproach by integrating the trial data with relevant back-
round information; and 3) suggest actions to encourage the
doption of this new exemplar by clinical investigators,
ournal editors, and practitioners alike.
OUNDATIONS OF CLASSIC STATISTICAL INFERENCE
acile Interpretation of Statistical Hypotheses (FISH) is a
andomized trial of two hypothetical treatments (A and B).
n designing the trial, the investigators assumed a 9%
aseline event rate, based on previously published data, and
20% relative risk reduction (equivalent to an odds ratio
OR] of 0.78), representing their estimate of the smallest
linically important difference in outcome for the “superior”
reatment over the prescribed period of follow-up. Setting
he type I () error at 5% and the type II () error at 10%,
hey determined that a sample of 4,937 patients is required
or each treatment group. Upon conducting this trial, a total
f 430 events (8.6%) were observed among 5,000 patients
ssigned to treatment A versus 500 events (10%) among
,000 patients assigned to treatment B (Table 1). The OR
or this 1.4% absolute difference is 0.85 (95% confidence
nterval [CI] 0.74 to 0.97), and the 14% relative risk
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Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trials June 2, 2004:1929–39eduction is determined to be statistically significant (2 
.6, p  0.02). The investigators thereby concluded that
reatment A is superior to treatment B, and that the
agnitude of risk reduction is clinically important, because
he CI for the OR includes the 0.78 threshold value. Shortly
fter the study was published, B. A. Zion, Professor of
linical Epistemology at New Haven University, submitted
letter to the editor—impolitely entitled “FISHy Conclu-
ions”—arguing that the data are consistent instead with
bout a 10% chance that the observed risk reduction is
linically important, as well as a 25% chance that the two
reatments are actually equivalent! What is the basis for
hese contradictory interpretations?
Just as many questions in cardiology require us to know
omething of the relevant laws of physics (for instance, the
ules governing fluid pressure and flow), this question requires
s to know something of the relevant principles of logic (the
ules of evidence). As we shall see, the controversy here stems
rom two rival views of scientific inference—as profoundly
ifferent as luminal narrowing and plaque instability in the
athophysiology of atherosclerotic events—and because most
f us have never received formal instruction regarding these
iews, we must begin with a brief synopsis.
Our investigators’ stylized conclusions are grounded on
. A. Fisher’s time-honored theory of statistical inference (25).
isher recognized that deductive hypotheses, such as if a then
, can be refuted with certainty by so much as a single
bservation of a and not b, but that statistical hypotheses, such
s if a then b with probability c, cannot be refuted by any number
Abbreviations and Acronyms
CI  confidence interval
FRISC  Fragmin and Fast
Revascularization during
InStability in Coronary artery
disease trial
HPS  Heart Protection Study
LIFE  Losartan Intervention for
Endpoint reduction in
hypertension trial
OR  odds ratio
PURSUIT  Platelet Glycoprotein IIb/IIIa in
Unstable Angina Receptor
Suppression Using Integrilin
Therapy trial
RITA  Randomized Intervention
Treatment of Angina trial
TACTICS TIMI-18  Treat Angina with Aggrastat
and determine Cost of Therapy
with an Invasive or Conservative
Strategy-Thrombolysis In
Myocardial Infarction-18 trial
TIMI-IIIB  Thrombolysis In Myocardial
Infarction-IIIB trial
VANQWISH  Veterans Affairs Non–Q-wave
Infarction Strategies in Hospital
trialf observations. He responded to this difficulty by positing that sstatistical conjecture (what he called the “null hypothesis”)
hould be “rejected,” instead, by an observation that is unlikely,
elative to all other possible observations, on the assumption of
hat conjecture (25). His famous p value (the tail area under a
requency distribution representing the null hypothesis) was
he evidentiary measure that provided a quantitative rationale
or this judgment. As he expressed it, a small p value means,
Either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred or the [null
ypothesis] is not true” (25).
Fisher’s argument is roughly that of a deductive syllogism:
If the null hypothesis is true,
then the observations are unlikely
The observations occurred.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is unlikely.
ut if this argument sounds right to you, consider its
arallel:
If Tom has hypertension,
then he is unlikely to have pheochromocytoma.
Tom has pheochromocytoma.
Therefore, he is unlikely to have hypertension.
his faulty reasoning is identical to that used to characterize
patient as abnormal, just because some diagnostic test
esult falls outside its putative normal range—a one-
imensional strategy equivalent to relying solely on the
pecificity (or its complement, the false-positive rate) of the
est (17,18). Thus, although Fisher’s approach has been
upremely influential, critics charge he never provided it
ith a fully objective foundation (16,19).
Neyman and Pearson (26) sought to overcome this
ifficulty by testing the null hypothesis, not in isolation, as
id Fisher, but in comparison to one or more alternative
ypotheses. To do so, they defined a new test statistic (the
atio of the likelihood of the observations given the null
ypothesis to the likelihood of the observations given the
lternative hypothesis), and used Fisher’s approach to de-
ermine if this “likelihood ratio” exceeded some threshold at
redefined false-positive () and false-negative () levels of
rror. If so, they argued, then the null hypothesis was to be
ejected, not by way of Fisher’s inductive logic, but on
ragmatic grounds that “. . . in the long run of experience,
e shall not often be wrong” (27).
This so-called “frequentist” approach is the same as that
sed to classify a patient as abnormal whenever the true-
ositive rate of some diagnostic test result is greater than its
alse-positive rate (28). Although this two-dimensional
trategy did succeed in providing a rationale for some of
isher’s arbitrary choices, it did not really circumvent the
able 1. Primary Outcomes in the FISH Trial
Treatment A Treatment B
vent 430 (8.6%) 500 (10%)
o event 4,570 (91.4%) 4,500 (90%)ubjectivity inherent in the process of statistical inference
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June 2, 2004:1929–39 Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trials29) (for example, the 20% relative risk reduction that went
nto the sample size determination [30] for the FISH trial).
The founding fathers were well aware of such subjective
nfluences. Fisher acknowledged that his calculations were
. . . absurdly academic . . .” and that the prudent scientist
. . . rather gives his mind to each particular case in the light
f the evidence and his ideas” (25). Likewise, Pearson freely
dmitted that he and Neyman (31):
left in our mathematical model a gap for the exercise of a
more intuitive process of personal judgement in such mat-
ters. . .as the choice of the most likely class of admissible
hypotheses, the appropriate significance level, the magni-
tude of worthwhile effects and the balance of utilities.
onetheless, the frequentist school has since come to sweep
hese matters under the carpet in its rush to venerate a single
etric—the iconic p value—both as Neyman-Pearson’s
long run” error rate and Fisher’s “rare chance” evidentiary
easure (never mind that the two interpretations are mu-
ually inconsistent) (23).
IMITATIONS OF THE CLASSIC APPROACH
his p value is usually computed from some amalgam of the
bservations (such as z or t or 2). The z statistic, for example,
s formulated as the mean difference in outcome between two
roups divided by the standard error of the mean:
z 
xA  xB
A2nA  B
2
nB
here xA and xB are the mean values for groups A and B; A
nd B are their standard deviations; and nA and nB are their
ample sizes.1
Frequentist summary statistics such as this behave badly
hen applied to clinical megatrials. Because the sample size
ppears as a reciprocal in the denominator of the above
quation, for example, the value of z will increase with the
ize of the trial for any non-zero numerator. Consequently,
he p value (the tail area for z under the null hypothesis) will
ecome arbitrarily small as the sample size becomes arbitrarily
arge (15). Eventually, even the smallest difference in outcome
annot escape the pull of a “statistical black hole” fueled by a
ufficient mass of patients.2 Carried to the extreme, everything
ecomes “significant” in a trial of infinite size.
This is no idle speculation. Just as a normal heart can fail
f the imposed stress is great enough, any difference in
utcome, however trivial in magnitude, will become “statisti-
ally significant” if the clinical trial is large enough, as with the
.4% absolute difference among 10,000 subjects in our FISH
rial. Smaller p value thresholds (e.g., 0.005 vs. 0.05) will
ostpone, but not prevent, the problem. In practical terms,
hen, some trials may have to be large, but never too large.
1When nA and nB are large, swapping their values in this equation provides an
xpression in which z2  t2  2.
2If nA  nB, this “mass” is given by n  2z
2v/d 2, where v is the pooled variance
2 2 A   B) and d is the difference in outcome (xA  xB). aEven if the p value were numerically well behaved, it
ould nevertheless remain deeply misleading. Technically,
he p value quantifies the probability of having obtained the
ata (or even more extreme, unobserved data), assuming the
ull hypothesis is true. However, what we really want to
now is the inverse or “posterior” probability that the null
ypothesis is true given the data that were observed. Many
elieve—or act as if they believe—the p value represents
his more relevant posterior probability (17). But it does not!
The probability that “Tom is hypertensive given that he
as pheochromocytoma” is not the same as the inverse
robability that “Tom has pheochromocytoma given that he
s hypertensive.” Likewise, the probability of observing a
ifference in outcome (p  0.05) given that treatments A
nd B are equivalent is not the same as the probability that
reatments A and B are equivalent given the observed
ifference in outcome (hence, our fallacious syllogisms).
imply stated, the “bassackward” p value provides the right
nswer to the wrong question.
The right question is, “What do you know about hypoth-
sis h after seeing evidence e?”, and the p value is the wrong
nswer to this question. The right answer (the posterior
robability for h given e) clearly cannot be based on e alone,
ut must depend also on one’s answer to the more primitive
uestion, “What did you know about h before seeing e?” (the
rior probability for h).
As a matter of fact, specific neurons in the parietal cortex
hysically encode and process such prior probabilities (32)
y the time we are four years of age (33). However, the
requentist (like a sentencing judge who overlooks the prior
onvictions of a habitual criminal) ignores these signals.
his “historical blindness” is particularly disabling with
egard to megatrials for which prior information is usually
bundant.
DVANTAGES OF A BAYESIAN APPROACH
ayes’ theorem resolves this spectrum of problems (19,29).
t can be expressed succinctly by the following relation:
p(he)  p(eh) p(h)
n words, the probability for the hypothesis given the
vidence (the “posterior”) is proportional to the probability
or the evidence given the hypothesis (the “likelihood”)
imes the probability for the hypothesis independent of the
vidence (the “prior”). This seminal relationship—a
traightforward consequence of the fundamental axioms of
robability theory3—bridges Pearson’s aforementioned
gap,” by connecting the evidentiary observations to the
istorical context within which they occur. Scientific infer-
3By definition, the “conditional probability” p(h·e)  p(h and e)/p(e) and p(e·h) 
(h and e)/p(h). Thus, p(h and e)  p(e·h)  p(h), and, by substitution, p(h·e)  p(e·h)
p(h)/p(e). Because the evidence itself is fixed for a given experiment, we can drop
(e) from this equation and express the relationship more simply as a proportionality.
he equality is restored by expressing the remaining probabilities in terms of
onjugate distribution functions, such as the Gaussian, that are normalized to a unit
rea.
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Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trials June 2, 2004:1929–39nce, like common sense, is thereby seen to rely equally on
he background information and the empirical data.
However, there is a price to be paid for this gain. To a
ayesian, probabilities represent degrees of belief rather than
eal-world frequencies (29), even those expressed in terms of
atios (34) or distributions (35) of empirical counts, and
ecause our beliefs are not always based on (objective) data,
hey often come from the (subjective) mind of the observer.
ow, if different observers have different prior beliefs, they
ill have different posterior beliefs given the same set of
ata. These subjective prior beliefs are anathema to the
requentist, who relies instead on a series of ad hoc algo-
ithms that maintain the facade of scientific objectivity, even
hile taking similar liberties apropos Pearson’s “gap” (31).
Thus, the frequentist first calculates the value of one or
nother test statistic quantifying the degree to which the
bservations deviate from those expected under the null
ypothesis (2  5.6 for FISH, based on Table 1), then
stimates the frequency of observing at least this value in
umerous imaginary repetitions of the experiment under
hat hypothesis (p  0.02 for FISH, analogous to the 4%
alse-positive rate for	1.5 mm exercise-induced electrocar-
iographic ST-segment depression for diagnosis of coronary
rtery disease [36]), and “rejects” the hypothesis if this p
alue fails to reach some arbitrary threshold (e.g.,  0.05).
arold Jeffreys, a pupil of Fisher’s and the first to develop a
undamental theory of scientific inference based on Bayes’
heorem, summarizes this convoluted reasoning process by
oting that (37):
A hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not
predicted observable results that have not occurred. (italics as in
the original)4
Instead, the Bayesian calculates the likelihood of the
bservations with respect to the test hypothesis and then
ultiplies this likelihood by a prior probability to obtain the
osterior probability. In this context, ignoring the prior
ould be as much a failing as ignoring the data.
Using this approach, clinicians have come to appreciate that
diagnostic hypothesis cannot be properly assessed solely by
eference to the one-dimensional specificity or two-
imensional likelihood ratio of some test, but only by a
hree-dimensional integration of the sensitivity and specificity
ith the probability of disease in the patient being tested (34).
Likewise, a scientific hypothesis cannot be properly as-
essed solely by reference to the observational data, but only
hrough the integration of those data with one’s prior beliefs
egarding the hypothesis. Bayes’ theorem is the formal
eans by which we perform this explicit integration—a
ogically consistent, mathematically valid, and intuitive way
o draw inferences about the hypothesis in light of our
xperience (19,29).
In contrast, pure evidentiary metrics (such as p values,
Is, and likelihood ratios) are no more than compass
4Recall Tweedledum’s demonstration of logic to Alice: “[I]f it was so, it might be;
pnd if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it aint.eadings. They tell us only where we are going—toward or
way from some hypothesis—but not where we are.
Therefore, the straightforward Bayesian approach has a
umber of practical advantages over the convoluted conven-
ional approach: 1) it eliminates the frequentist’s “historical
lindness,” thereby facilitating the integration of prior knowl-
dge with new empirical data; 2) it replaces the “bassackward”
value with a measure having true clinical relevance—the
robability for the study hypothesis given the observations; and
) it skirts the “statistical black hole” resulting from large
amples, thereby forestalling erroneous inferences. Additional
dvantages are summarized in Table 2.
In summary, the operative standard of scientific inference
the frequentist p value) is undermined by a variety of
heoretical and practical shortcomings. Its failings call into
uestion the published conclusions of many highly influen-
ial clinical megatrials (38–40), thereby echoing a recent
ew York Times claim that, “half of what doctors know is
rong” (41). Cynics might well acknowledge these failings,
ut argue nonetheless that our polemic is directed at a straw
an—that no one really relies on p values to the exclusion
f other important factors. Indeed, investigators often en-
ertain a number of Bayesian-like assumptions in the course
f a clinical trial (such as the 20% threshold for clinical
mportance [42] in FISH), but they usually do so only to
stimate the sample sizes required for calculating the p
alues expected of them by the statisticians, journal editors,
nd reviewers. Editorialists similarly enlist a number of
ayesian-like considerations in their post hoc commentaries
n these trials, but this is usually done to explain away
onflicts between the empirical results and their own pre-
onceived notions (43). Lacking legitimate ways to charac-
erize the truth of their hypotheses, how would any of them
ver come to learn which half of what they “know” is wrong?
NTEGRATING PRIOR BELIEFS WITH EMPIRICAL DATA
ayes’ theorem is the heart of this learning process by which
e update our existing beliefs (the prior) with new infor-
ation (the data). Thus, just as medical diagnosis begins
ith the clinical history, learning begins with the prior; and
ust as the history begins from ignorance so too does that
able 2. Frequentist Versus Bayesian Attributes of Randomized
linical Trials
Attribute Frequentist Bayesian
rior information Excluded Included
ubjective influences Implicit Explicit
heoretical foundation Inconsistent Consistent
andomization Essential Incidental
ample size Prespecified Unrestricted
lpha and beta errors Prespecified Unnecessary
topping rules Prespecified Unnecessary
est hypothesis Prespecified Unrestricted
ummary measure p value Posterior probability
linical interpretation Misleading Straightforwardrior (29,37,44). Accordingly, when the component risks
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June 2, 2004:1929–39 Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trialsp1  1  q1 and p2  1  q2) are proportionately low, we
an employ the OR (p1q2/p2q1) or its Gaussian transform—
he log OR—as an estimate of relative risk (p1/p2) (45–48),
nd thereby model our initial state of ignorance with respect
o the typical null hypothesis by a uniform distribution for
og OR (with mean xp  0 and standard deviation p1).
Few investigators, however, are inclined to believe that
he null effect will be exactly zero, believing instead that the
ffect might be so small as to be clinically unimportant.
oreover, because megatrials are very demanding of re-
ources, they are rarely initiated under conditions of maxi-
um ignorance. We can mirror these constraints by defin-
ng some “clinically unimportant” interval of equivalence
bout the null value for xp (	5%, for example) (47), and
arying p so as to adjust the proportion of the distribution
alling within that interval (24), in accordance with our
eliefs (Fig. 1). Alternatively, we can derive the parameters
f the prior distribution (xp and p) from previously avail-
ble data (46), just as we determine the parameters of the
mpirical distribution (xe and e) from the current trial
ata.5
Now that we have independent determinations of a prior
istribution for the log OR based on our beliefs before
onsideration of the trial data, G(xp, p), and an empirical
istribution based on the trial data alone, G(xe, e), we can
5Given a 2  2 matrix of patient outcomes as in Table 1:
 a bc d 
he mean log odds ratio (xe) is ln(ad/bc), and its standard deviation (e) is (1/a  1/b
1/2
igure 1. Alternative prior distributions of log odds ratio (OR) with
espect to the null hypothesis, based on a “clinically unimportant” interval
f 	5% about the mean of zero (from 0.05 to 0.05). All curves are
ormalized to the same unit area. An uninformative reference prior (not
llustrated) is defined by a uniform distribution for the log OR (p  10).
maller standard deviations represent greater degrees of skepticism with
espect to the test hypothesis. At a mildly skeptical p  0.4, 10% of the
istribution is contained within the clinically unimportant null interval; at
moderately skeptical p  0.07, 50% is within the interval; and at a highly
keptical p  0.03, 90% is within the interval.1/c  1/d) .ultiply the two according to Bayes’ theorem to obtain its
osterior distribution:6
G
xpe, pe)  G(xp, p)  G(xe, e)
igure 2 illustrates one such analysis using empirical data
rom a previously published megatrial PURSUIT [5]) and
he moderately skeptical prior distribution illustrated in
igure 1:
G
0.07, 0.05  G
0,0.07  G
0.12, 0.06
We can use the resultant posterior distribution to quan-
ify the probability for any interval therapeutic response (the
rea under the curve between putative limits of interest) or
ny magnitude of therapeutic response (the area to the right
r left of some putative threshold), as shown in Figure 3.
MPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
F THE BAYESIAN APPROACH
ensitivity analysis. According to Bayes’ theorem, then,
ur belief about the hypothesis after seeing the data depends
n our belief about the hypothesis before seeing the data.
6The product of two Gaussians is another Gaussian. Thus, a prior distribution with
ean xp and standard deviation p times an empirical distribution with mean xe and
tandard deviation e equals a posterior distribution having the following (variance
eighted) mean xpe and standard deviation pe:
xpe 
xp
p
2
xe
e
2
1
 2

1
 2
and pe   1p2 1e2
1/ 2
igure 2. Bayesian analysis of a representative clinical megatrial (5). The
urve labeled “Prior” represents the operative prior distribution for log odds
atio (OR) (xp  0, p  0.07); the curve labeled “Evidence” represents the
istribution for log OR based on the empirical data (xe  0.12, e 
.06); and the curve labeled “Posterior” represents the distribution for log
R derived from the product of the prior and the evidence (xpe  0.07,
pe  0.05). The smaller the standard deviation, the narrower is the
istribution and the greater is its information content and precision. All
urves are normalized to the same unit area. Probabilities for any magni-
ude of response can be computed directly in terms of the area under the
ppropriate region of the posterior distribution. The conventional (one-
ailed) p value is represented by the proportion of the evidentiary distri-
ution to the right of zero (here, 0.021).p e
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Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trials June 2, 2004:1929–39his variable degree of belief stands in sharp contrast to the
requentist’s categorical interpretation of the p value as
significant” or “nonsignificant,” based on the data alone.
bviously, such variability will influence our subsequent
nferences in material ways. We can determine the degree of
his influence by performing graphical or tabular sensitivity
nalyses (17,44,46) similar to those employed by economists
nd decision theorists (49).
Table 3 summarizes representative sensitivity analyses for
spectrum of well-known cardiovascular trials (5–13,50),
nd Figure 4 illustrates one of these analyses (for the HPS
6]) graphically. Each of these trials—one of which (LIFE
8]) is quantitatively similar to our hypothetical FISH
igure 3. Determination of probabilities from the posterior distribution in
igure 2. The solid area within the “clinically unimportant” null interval
or log odds ratio (OR) (ranging from 0.05 to 0.05) represents 34% of
he total area under the distribution, and the probability that the log OR
ies within this null interval is therefore 0.34. Similarly, the solid area with
log OR 0.1 (equivalent to 10% improvement in outcome) repre-
ents 21% of the total area, and the probability that the log OR is 0.1
s therefore 0.21.
Table 3. Posterior Null Probability for Represe
Trial Sample Size p Value
PURSUIT (5) 9,461 0.04
HPS (6) 20,536 0.0003
GUSTO (7) 30,516 0.001
LIFE (8) 9,193 0.021
HOPE (9) 9,297 0.001
BHAT (10) 3,828 0.005†
4S (11) 4,444 0.0003
MADIT-II (12) 1,232 0.016
ASCOT-LLA (13) 10,305 0.0005
Lyon Diet Heart (50) 423 0.0003
*Probability that the logarithm of the odds ratio lies within a
terms of odds ratio) given the prior and the empirical data.
probabilities and, therefore, weaker evidence of therapeutic
investigators.xe  empirical mean; e  empirical standard deviation; p rial—reported a p value or CI for the comparison of some
rimary outcome in two randomized groups (A vs. B).
ence, the investigators formally entertained the null hy-
othesis—an implicit representation of clinical equipoise
51)—as the operative basis of their statistical analysis (even
f this hypothesis might have conflicted with previously
vailable data or their own personal beliefs). Accordingly,
e determined the posterior probability for this null hy-
othesis given the empirical data, based on an uninforma-
ive and moderately skeptical prior.
In each case, the specific magnitude of posterior null
robability is highly dependent on our particular choice of
rior (the smaller the value of p, the more informative is
hat prior and the greater is its influence relative to the
mpirical data). With an uninformative prior, the posterior
ve Clinical Trials
(Odds Ratio)
(xe  e)
Posterior Null Probability*
Uninformative
Prior
(p  10)
Moderately
Skeptical Prior
(p  0.07)
0.12	 0.06 0.125 0.314
0.15	 0.04 0.009 0.041
0.16	 0.05 0.015 0.075
0.18	 0.06 0.023 0.146
0.28	 0.06 0.000 0.003
0.33	 0.12 0.007 0.231
0.37	 0.10 0.001 0.098
0.40	 0.15 0.010 0.328
0.45	 0.13 0.001 0.175
1.29	 0.32 0.000 0.350
terval ranging from 0.05 to 0.05 (equivalent to 	5% in
r null intervals or more skeptical priors produce higher null
. †Calculated from published data, but not reported by the
igure 4. Relationship between prior and posterior probability for the null
ypothesis in the Heart Protection Study (6). The x-axis of this graph
epresents the prior probability that the log odds ratio (OR) lies within a
utative “clinically unimportant” region of equivalence (	5% about a null
alue of 0, as described in the legend to Figure 1), and the y-axis represents
he associated posterior probability. The open circles (and standard
eviations) are for the mildly skeptical, moderately skeptical, and highly
keptical priors, as illustrated in Figure 1. An analysis that is insensitive to
ne’s prior degree of skepticism indicates a greater degree of stability in the
esultant inferences. See text for further discussion.ntati
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June 2, 2004:1929–39 Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trialsull is similar to the reported p value, but increases nonlin-
arly with more informative priors (as in Fig. 4). Using a
oderately skeptical prior, the posterior null probabilities
ange widely (from near zero to over 30%), regardless of the
mpirical log ORs. As a result, our beliefs concerning these
ighly influential, statistically significant megatrials appear
ess confident than implied by the p values alone.
This is not to imply that the published conclusions
egarding any of these trials are necessarily wrong (some-
hing no programmatic system of induction can do), but
ather to highlight the potential for such errors. Bayesian
nalysis minimizes this potential by reinforcing the empir-
cal evidence with the prior information. It does not
uarantee that each of us will look at the same data and
ome to the same conclusion, but it does assure that we will
o so if we begin with the same prior beliefs. It is in just this
ay that the Bayesian approach can be considered scientif-
cally “objective.”
In the FISH trial, too, the posterior probability is highly
ependent on our particular choice of prior. Using a
oderately skeptical prior, the posterior probability for the
	5%) interval null hypothesis is 0.23 (recall B. A. Zion’s
5% chance of equivalence), but falls to 0.05 based on a
ildly skeptical prior and rises to 0.81 based on a highly
keptical prior. Including such sensitivity analyses in pub-
ished trial reports would serve to obviate any appearance
hat the investigators have gerrymandered these subjective
arameters in support of a particular point of view.
agnitude of therapeutic response. One of the most
mportant advantages of Bayesian analysis is its ability to assess
ny magnitude of therapeutic response (i.e., the probability that
he risk reduction exceeds some putative “threshold of benefit”
iven the observations), rather than the precise null magnitude
o which the p value refers (i.e., the frequency of obtaining a
isk reduction of at least the magnitude observed given that the
rue magnitude is 0) (47,52). Table 4 summarizes such thresh-
ld analyses for the same trials as those in Table 3, using an
ninformative prior (xp  0, p  10). In each case, the
Table 4. Posterior Probability of Benefit for R
Trial
% RRR
(95% CI)
PURSUIT (5) 9 (0–18)
HPS (6) 12 (6–18)
GUSTO (7) 14 (6–21)
LIFE (8) 14 (4–23)
HOPE (9) 21 (13–28)
BHAT (10) 26 (9–41)
4S (11) 28 (14–40)
MADIT II (12) 28 (8–44)
ASCOT-LLA (13) 35 (17–49)
Lyon Diet Heart (50) 68 (48–83)
*Probability that the percent of relative risk reduction (%RRR
(0%, 10%, 20%, 30%), based on an uninformative prior and
CI  confidence interval.osterior probability for benefit falls as the threshold for benefit tncreases and is far less than that implied by conventional
tatistical significance.
Figure 5 illustrates a comparable analysis of therapeutic
enefit for our hypothetical FISH trial, again using an
ninformative prior. Although the chance of any degree of
enefit (0%) approaches 100% (consistent with the statis-
ically significant p value of 0.02), the chance of 10%
enefit is only 77%, and the chance of 20% benefit is no
ore than 13%. These values are summarized in Table 5,
long with those for several more informative, skeptical
riors.
This approach provides us with a clinically relevant
umerical substitute for p values in the published reports of
hese trials. Recall that the FISH investigators assumed that
he smallest clinically important risk reduction was 20%. If
o, then the most relevant representation of the trial results
s given by the posterior probability that the relative risk
eduction exceeds this putative threshold. As noted earlier,
he value of this probability is 0.13, using an uninformative
rior (and would be even less for more informative priors, as
hown in the bottom row of Table 5). Thus, despite a
igure 5. Sensitivity analysis with respect to the magnitude of therapeutic
enefit (relative risk reduction) for the hypothetical FISH trial, using an
ninformative prior. The posterior probability of benefit falls as the
entative Clinical Trials
Posterior Probability of Benefit*
RRR
>10%
RRR
>20%
RRR
>30%
9 0.581 0.033 0.000
9 0.847 0.030 0.000
4 0.858 0.089 0.000
7 0.876 0.252 0.003
9 0.999 0.844 0.092
8 0.974 0.826 0.420
9 0.996 0.926 0.547
9 0.973 0.879 0.619
9 0.996 0.958 0.757
0 1.000 1.000 0.999
ater than the putative threshold value for clinical importance
pirical data.epres
RRR
>0%
0.97
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00
) is gre
the emhreshold of benefit increases.
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Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trials June 2, 2004:1929–39tatistically significant p value of 0.02—and contrary to the
onclusion drawn by the investigators using CIs—there is
ittle more than a 10% chance that the observed magnitude
f benefit is clinically important (consistent, again, with
. A. Zion’s assessment).
This is just what we should have expected. Even if the
bserved risk reduction equaled the 20% threshold for
linical importance, this value represents the mean of a
ymmetrical Gaussian distribution. Thus, there would be
nly a 50% chance that the risk reduction exceeded this
ean value and a 50% chance that it did not. However,
ecause the observed risk reduction was only 14%, the
hance of exceeding the 20% threshold is even less than this.
n the final analysis, then, despite its impressive sample size
nd significant p value, FISH turns out to be a quantitative
xample of the rhetorical “distinction without a difference.”
ayesian meta-analysis. By its nature, Bayesian analysis is
articularly suited to the meta-analysis of clinical trials address-
ng a common hypothesis. The aggressive (“anatomy-driven”)
ersus conservative (“ischemia-driven”) management of acute
oronary syndromes is a case in point. Over the past decade,
ve large, randomized trials have examined this issue in almost
,000 patients (53). Results have been inconsistent—with the
wo older trials supporting a conservative approach (TIMI-
IIB and VANQWISH) and the three more recent trials
FRISC-II, TACTICS TIMI-18, and RITA-3) supporting
n aggressive approach—predominantly with respect to surro-
ate outcomes such as recurrent ischemia and referral for
evascularization. The impact on definitive outcomes such as
eath and myocardial infarction remains controversial; a recent
eta-analysis reported a 12% reduction in relative risk for these
vents (p 0.04), despite significant heterogeneity from study
o study (p  0.005) (54).
The top panel of Figure 6 illustrates a Bayesian meta-
nalysis of these studies, with respect to these definitive
utcomes, in a sequence that parallels their dates of publication
54). The first trial (TIMI-IIIB) is analyzed using an uninfor-
ative prior given the absence of previous data. Thereafter, the
osterior for the preceding trial serves as the prior for the subsequent
rial. As illustrated in Figure 6, the second trial (VAN-
WISH) has a substantial negative impact on the probability
f benefit given the limited amount of prior information
TIMI-IIIB) available at the time, but this is offset by subse-
uent trials (FRISC-II and TACTICS TIMI-18). Conse-
uently, the most recent trial (RITA-3) has little effect on the
Table 5. Posterior Probability of Benefit Based
Threshold
of Benefit
(%)
Po
Uninformative
Prior
(p  10) (
0 0.992
10 0.769
20 0.128
p  prior standard deviation.osterior probability given the large amount of prior informa-ion available from the four trials preceding it. This meta-
nalysis indicates a 70% chance that the risk reduction is more
han 10%, but only a 10% chance it is more than 20%. In other
ords, there is a 30% chance the risk reduction is under 10%
nd a 90% chance it is under 20%—values far different from
hat implied by a conventional meta-analysis (54) (summarized
n the bottom panel of Fig. 6). Thus, although conventional
eta-analysis shows that aggressive management is asso-
iated with a statistically significant reduction in death
nd myocardial infarction, Bayesian meta-analysis sug-
ests that the magnitude of this reduction is unlikely to
e clinically important.
NCOURAGING THE ADOPTION
F AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
n the end, statistical inference—whether frequentist or
ayesian—can take us only so far. In fact, our clinical
ecisions are rarely based on subjective judgments or objec-
ive data alone, but rather on something between and
eyond the two—the ethical doctrines that ultimately imbue
he decisions with meaning and value.
Such valuations typically rely on the utilitarian principle
dvocating “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers”
55). This principle is commonly applied to strategic deci-
ions regarding health care policy. The current emphasis on
linical outcomes and prescriptive guidelines is a clear
eflection of both its influence on modern medical practice
nd the importance of probabilistic reasoning to clinical
ecision-making. In this context, good decisions succeed in
alancing the objective scientific data against our subjective
thical values; they are evidence-based, but not evidence-
ound. This is more than metaphor. Our brains are actually
ardwired to compute probabilities and utilities using the
ery same principles of game theory and decision analysis
hat describe rational economic behavior (32,56,57).
Several journals have taken a leadership position in the
linical application of these principles (58). The Journal of
he American Medical Association’s decade-long series of
Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature” provides physi-
ians with strategies and tools to interpret (59) and apply
60) such evidence in the care of their patients, and the
nnals of Internal Medicine’s “Information for Authors” now
ncludes specific recommendations that contributors (61):
. . . use Bayesian methods as an adjunct to frequentist
ne’s Choice of Prior
or Probability of Benefit
Skeptical Priors
0.4) (p  0.07) (p  0.03)
1 0.957 0.831
0 0.263 0.001
0 0.001 0.000on O
steri
p 
0.99
0.75
0.11approaches, . . . state the process by which they obtained the
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June 2, 2004:1929–39 Bayesian Interpretation of Clinical Trialsprior probabilities, [and] . . . make clear the relative contri-
butions of the prior distribution and the data, through the
reporting of . . . posterior probabilities for various priors.
Despite this enlightened editorial endorsement, however,
here are only 322 citations for the search string Bayes*
igure 6. (Top panel) Sequential Bayesian meta-analysis with respect to
aggressive” versus “conservative” management of acute ischemic syn-
romes in five clinical trials (A through E). The acronyms and publication
ates of the trials are as follows: A  TIMI-IIIB (1994); B  VAN-
WISH (1998); C  FRISC-II (1999); D  TACTICS TIMI-18
2001); E  RITA-3 (2002). The y-axis of the graph represents the
osterior probability of therapeutic benefit for the hypothesis that the 6- to
2-month risk of death or myocardial infarction exceeded the putative
hreshold of benefit (0%, 10%, 20%). The x-axis denotes the
equence of the analysis in parallel with the date of publication: A (given an
ninformative prior); B given A; C given A and B; D given A and B and
; E given A and B and C and D. (Bottom panel) A conventional
xed-effects meta-analysis of the same trials. The solid squares represent
ean risk ratios derived from the empirical data, and the horizontal lines
epresent associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The solid diamond
epresents the overall risk ratio (its extremes denoting the associated 95%
I). A chi-square test for heterogeneity reveals significant heterogeneity
mong the studies (p  0.017), attributable almost entirely to FRISC-II,
nd an overall OR of 0.88 in favor of the aggressive approach (95% CI 0.78
o 1.00; p  0.04).mong 374,747 clinical trial citations in the National tibrary of Medicine’s PubMed data base since the publica-
ion of Cornfield’s seminal 1969 paper proposing the
pplication of Bayes’ theorem to clinical trial assessment
62) (as of January 12, 2004). In the last analysis, then, we
ould be well advised to develop academic, political, and
conomic incentives to encourage the diffusion of these
ecommendations into common practice.
We do not champion a particular means to this end.
nstead, we advocate agencies such as the National Insti-
utes of Health, Food and Drug Administration, Center for
edicare and Medicaid Services (formerly the Health Care
inancing Administration), and Institute of Medicine to
mpanel a task force of experts along the lines of the
onsolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT)
roup (63) to perform this function. The task force—
omprising clinicians, trialists, health outcomes researchers,
pidemiologists, statisticians, journal editors, and policy
akers—should be mandated to standardize the represen-
ations and choice of prior probability, as well as methods to
ntegrate the posterior probability with the observed mag-
itude of treatment effect (e.g., absolute and relative risk
eductions). The standards should be supported by scientific
omparisons of previously published empirical data and by
uitable computer simulations. Appropriately vetted statis-
ical software instantiating these standards should be devel-
ped and disseminated via the Internet (64).
Large, randomized trials, as well as their subsequent
eta-analyses, are highly demanding of resources and pos-
ess an aura of scientific respectability that almost ensures
heir publication in influential medical journals, even in the
ace of methodological deficiencies (39,65–67). For just
hese reasons, greater attention must be paid to explicitly
uantifying the probability for the hypotheses being tested
y these trials and the degree of credibility that their
onclusions are to be accorded. Until then, evidence-based
edicine will continue to rest more on the limitations of
tatistical inference than on the strength of the evidence
tself.
None of this will happen overnight. Giants from Bayes
nd Laplace to Fisher and Jeffreys have debated the foun-
ations of inductive logic for over 200 years without
esolution, and our recondite comments are unlikely to
hange anyone’s prior convictions regarding these matters.
ore than a century ago, the eminent nineteenth century
hysicist James Clerk Maxwell suggested the real way such
hange comes about, in noting that, “we believe in the wave
heory [of light] because everyone who believed in the
orpuscular theory has died.”
He was probably right (p  0.05).
cknowledgments
he authors gratefully appreciate the encouragement and
onstructive comments of three anonymous reviewers and
everal journal editors in our efforts to present these tech-
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